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CONFLICT OF LAVJS January, 1964 Final Examination 
Notes: (1) All discussion is to be done in accordance with material read and 
discussed in the course in Conflict of LaNS. (2) Total potential credit: one 
hundred points. 
I. (Flfteen points) 
A. Define, according to usage in our course } the following terms: 
1. Borrowing statute 
2. Characterization 
3. Renvoi 
4. Qualification statute. (Note: As you will recall, "qualification" is also 
used as a synonym of "characterization. II) 
5. Domicile 
B. Hark "yes" or uno II, as indicated. Choose the ans't-J'er closest to right, and 
do not add explanation. 
1. Does the full faith and credit clause of the United states Constitution, and 
its enabling legislation, apply equally in terms to the acts and judicial pro-
ceedings of sister-states? Yes No 
2. By the older view, can enforcement of the judgment of a sister-state be had 
under the full faith and credit clause, if that judgment is for future periodic 
alimony payments? Yes No 
3. Will enforcement of the judgment of a sister-state be required under the 
full faith and credit clause~ if that judgment is based on an incorrect inter-
pretation of the substantive law of the state where enforcement is sought? Yes 
No 
4. Will the otherwise-applicable statute of a sister-state be enforced in a 
case involving a cause of action that arose in that state, if that state's courts 
have characterized that statute as penal and those of the forum have character-
ized it as non-penal? Yes No 
5. Is there any essential policy difference between the enforceability of the 
judgments of a sister-state under the full faith and credit clause, and the 
enforceability, in the courts of this country, of the judgments of the courts of 
foreign countries? Yes No 
6. Is a statute of limitations usually characterized as substantive, if that 
statute stands alone? Yes No 
7. Does the law of the decedent's domicile at the tLme of making of his will 
govern the prooate and administration of his estate under that will, although 
he died domiciled in another jurisdiction? Yes No 
8. Does the law of the state of incorporation govern the amenability of a cor-
poration to suit by a rival business in another jurisdiction? Yes No 
9. Maya qualification statute be applied to a foreign corporation that is engaged 
to any important extent in doing business in interstate commerce in the enacting 
state? Yes No 
10. Is Renvoi a Euronean doctrine of conflict of laws, with almost no current ap-
plication in this cou~try? Yes No 
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II ( 'I1>Tenty pOints) 
A. Give a simple hypothetical fact situation~ patterned on the one discussed by 
us the other day in connection with an actual case , demonstrating and explaining 
the sort of triple characterizat ion problem t hat may now arise in the United 
states. 
B. Dis{ :J.ss briefly the following questions: 
1. The (a) facotrs involved in determining domicile , and (b) importance of 
determining domicile, in cases where domicile is a f actor. 
2. How has the doctrine of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins affected characteri-
zation technique? - -
3. To what conflicts situation has the bor rowing statute been made appli-
cable, and why? 
4. \~hat is the simple, basic, reason of legal policy for the law of conflict 
of laws? 
5. Compare the "local law" theory of choice of law with the "vested rightsll 
theory. Which important United States judge of recent memory has supported each? 
III (Twenty points) 
Discuss briefly (indicating facts , holding, and your opinion of, inter alia, 
the significance) ~ of the following cases: 
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co. 
Huntington v . Attrill 
Hughes v. Fet ter 
Sampson v. Channell 
Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton 
Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. 
IV (Ten points) 
Defendant, "Nad Nan Moe - Est. 1920 , " was a used-car dealer in Detroit, 
Michigan. He bought a 164 Thunderbird from Reginald Clarence ("Shady") Tree, 
giving in exchange an old Jeep and cash -- Tree representing that.he needed 
this for a mining stake. Tree told Moe that he had bought the lB~rd for cash 
from a dealer in New Jersey, and that it was free from liens. In fact, the car 
was mortgaged in New Jersey to P, who sues here to replevy the car from D, under 
the New Jersey recorded mortgage lien. 
D had had no actual notice of the existence of this mortgage, nor had he 
really had much chance to find out about it; for, although the car ~d New 
Jersey plates the mortgage lien did not appear on the face of the t~tle and 
D bought befo~e he had had much chance to do any checking in New Jersey. 
Who should win, and why? Discuss. 
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V. (Twenty points) 
. Jim and Bill, Minnesota residents, celebrat ed Nel-v Yeart s Eve by heavy drinking 
in .,various ~inneapoli~ b?-rs:, , ending up at "Chez Elite", owned and operated by 
D Hotel Chaln (an Illlnols corporation doing business in Illinois Wisconsin and 
Minnesota)~ Despite their obvious intoxication, they persuaded the bartende; to 
sell and serve them lIone for the road." After adding this fuel to all of the 
rest, they left for Chicago, Ill. in Jim's car, l~th Jim driving. While driving 
~n ~isconsin, Jim drove off the road into a stone wall, killing both passengers 
lns~antly. There were no witnesses, but no circumstances existed to indicate 
that the accident was caused otherwise than by Jim's intoxication. 
Minnesota has a IIDram Shop Act,1! which provides that: 
"No intoxicating liquor shall be sold to any person obviously intoxicated. 
Every person who is injured in person or property by any intoxicated person, or 
by reason of the intoxication of any person} has a right of action, in his or 
her own name, for all damages sustained, aga:Lnst any person who by illegally 
selling or giving intoxicating liquor caused or contributed to the intoxication 
of such person. I! 
Illinois has a similar statute. Wisconsin has no such statute. 
Minnesota, 1tJisconsin and Illinois all have wrongful death statutes of the 
usual type, those of Hisconsin and Illinois being unlimited in amount while that 
of Minnesota limits the maximum recovery to $10, 000. 
Minnesota common law places on plaintiff the burden of proving freedom from 
contributory negligence, but Hisconsin and Illinois place on defendant the burden 
of proving contributory negligence. 
P, entitled under the wrongful death acts as v-lidovl and sold dependent of 
Bill, brought an action in the Illinois court against D Hotel Chain. The trial 
court gave judgment for P for $100,000, based on a jury verdict, applying the 
Minnesota "Dram Shop Statute", because the court believed this was the proper law 
to govern the tort and was required by the full faith and credit clause of the 
United States Constitution. It held the Minnesota 1m .. inapplicable on the 
amount of damages. Despite Dts contention that Bill had been contributorily 
negligent, the trial judge instructed the jury that Illinois law applied on 
burden of proof of contributory negligence; the jury f ound specially that there 
was no evidence concerning contributory negligence , one way or the other. 
D appeals to the Illinois Court of Appeals. What arguments should be made 
for D on the conflict of laws issues involved in this appeal? How should they 
be decided? What arguments would you, as counsel for P, make? 
VI.. (Fifteen points) 
Mary, who was in business in Massachusetts as a beautician, suffered personal 
injuries in that state through her use of one of the products of D, Tony, Inc., 
a Connecticut corporation. The injury occurred on l'1ay 31 , 1962) and P sued in 
Connecticut to rec~ef damages in an action co~~enced ~n Aug. 1, 1963. The theory 
of the action was/tn~ injuries were due to negllgence ln the manufacture of the 
product that caused the injury. 
- While the period within which personal injury actions may be brought is one 
year in Connecticut the IvIassachusetts law provides that "action of tort and 
actions of contract'to recover for personal injuries shall be commenced only 
within two years next after the cause of action accrues.1! Discuss how the case 
should be decided. . _ ? 
Also, as Plaintiff, for what additional fact mlght you seek rather urgently. 
